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The future of South West Africa is inextricably linked to 
that of South Africa. Nothing except war can alter this 
association between South West Africa and South Africa.
- Prime Minister Jan Smuts
The people of the territory will have to get independence 
sooner or later. This political momentum has been set in 
motion. u,
- Foreign Minister Pik Botha
We do not believe in a system that sells people.
- Namibian Strike Leader
It must be borne in mind that the Namibian pel^ ple are 
shedding blood to liberate each and every inch Of the 
Namibian soil, thus each and every inch of the Namibian 
land must and will belong to the Namibian people.
- SWAPO President Sam Nujoma
NAMI3IA IN THE ’TOTAL STRATEGY’
The iirst two quotations do not- as it might seem - represent a change of 
basic goals or strategy but merely one of form. South Africa's determination 
1/0 and profit from dominating Namibia and to use it as a base for
dominating (and/or destabilising) its neighbours remains basically unchanged.
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'Independence' for Namibia to South Africa means something akin to the 
'independence' of the Bantustans. Therefore Pik Botha’s 1979 statement is no 
more compatible with the goals of Namibia's people enunciated in the second 
pair of quotations than was Prime Minster Smuts’ 194? declaration precisely 
because SA sees no contradiction between them and, therefore, the Namibian 
people see a continued denial, not a grudging acceptance, of their rights and 
aspirations in the evolution of South Africa's Namibia politik.
South Africa’s ’total strategy' in Namibia has had a different form from that 
in Angola, Mozambique or other Southern African states because Namibia is a 
South African colonial territory and has been for seventy odd years. However, 
South Africa has abandoned its earlier goal of literal incorporation of SWA as 
a 5th province so that its Namibian strategy and tactics are increasingly an 
integral part of the regional rather than the national front of its total 
strategy.
Domination and exploitation remain the central themes but South Africa's 
tactics have varied - partly as a result of deteriorating results in Namibia - 
partly because of international constraints and partly because the failure of 
the Smithorewa exercise in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (as it then was) indicated to it 
that its initial neo-colonial solution strategy was not viable. As a result 
the details and even some of the main features of the present South African 
design for consolidating and preserving domination and exploitation in Namibia 
are by no means clear - probably even to the South African decision takers. 
Further, Angola and Namibia are clearly interlocking elements in South African 
regional strategy, with policies in respect to each partly dependent on, and 
partly determining, these in respect to the other. For example, an 
independent Namibia with no foreign troops, no ANC bases, a quiet Orange River
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border, substantial economic relations with South Africa and using a South 
African occupied Walvis 3ay would meet many of SA's goals in respect to 
Namibia as such, but would also virtually end South Africa’s option to back 
UNITA to the degree necessary to secure a change of regime in (or a guaranteed 
oil supply from and export market in) Angola and therefore is not a decision 
the South African regime can opt for until - and unless - it determines 
whether it sees domination of/ensuring economic links with Angola as a crucial 
.objective to be pursued via armed force (SA or proxy) or not.
The elements in RSA strategy in respect to Namibia turn on:
A. War and Repression (i.e. use of force)
B. Politics and Negotiations
Internal 'SWA-Namibia'
International in respect to ’SWA to Namibia1 
Domestic - avoiding ’Who Lost Namibia’ as an effective 
Conservative Party battlecry at next election -
C. Economic
The gains and costs of exploitation and occupation 
The cost of the continuing war.
In the process of its Namibian policy since the late 1970s South Africa has - 
whether with strategic foresight or as a consequence of its tactical actions 
or both - created an ominously impressive infrastructure for destabilisation 
of an independent Namibia without major direct intervention by South African 
troops. While not impregnable, that infrastructure for destabilisation will 
require substantial diversion of resources and of policy attention by an 
independent Namibia to limit its impact and even so will significantly reduce 
the room :or manoeuvre open to Namibia at independence. Because what South
Africa’s rulers see as their ’bottom line' in respect to Namibia is not 
totally clear even to them, speculating on under what circumstances massive 
destabilisation would be practiced is an exercise in problematics. This is 
especially as South Africa has no incentive to be specific on what it would, 
as opposed to what it definitely would not, allow without major destabilising 
initiatives.
'THE FIFTH PROVINCE’
The roots of the present South African position on Namibia go back to its 1915 
military occupation of what was then known as German South West Africa. The 
South African delegation to the Conference at Versailles argued vigorously 
that the former German colony be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. 
The result was that South Africa was granted a Class C mandate as a 
compromise, which was seen, in the words of a British delegate sympathetic to 
the SA Government position, as "the equivalent of a 999 year lease as compared 
with a freehold”."'
The Pretoria Government was quite evidently not seriously displeased with the 
arrangement. General Smuts, then SA Prime Minister, argued in the SA
pParliament in 1925:
"I do not think it is necessary for us to annex South West Africa 
to the Union. The mandate for me is enough and it should be enough 
for the Union. It gives the Union such complete sovereignity, not 
only administrative, but legislative, that we need not ask for 
anything more".
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Pretoria has consistently regarded Namibia as effectively a 5th province of 
South Africa. This fundamentally remains South Africa's attitude up to and 
including the present, even though in recent years it has been forced to 
present its claims in different forms. But what has remained true is that 
under no circumstances does Pretoria envisage genuine independence for 
Namibia.
Soon after the UN was set up in 1946, General Smuts again presented South 
Africa's case for annexation of Namibia before the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly, arguing that the territory was de facto part of South Africa 
and that it should therefore be formally incorporated into the Union of South 
Africa. The Fourth Committee, however, rejected South Africa's claim and 
drafted a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the 14th of December, 
1946 calling on South Africa to place Namibia under the international 
Trusteeship System.
In 1947 SA rejected this. Later that year (1st November) the General Assembly 
again urged SA to place Namibia under the Trusteeship system as it was to do 
as many as ten times in the course of- the next eight years.
In 1949 the General Assembly (GA) sought, and in 1950 obtained, an advisory 
opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which the GA accepted in 
December, 1950. The ICJ found that South Africa still exercised the mandate 
and in effect was under obligation to submit reports to the UN on its 
administration of the territory. SA refused, as it did not recognise the 
competence of the UN to take over from the defunct League of Nations as the 
body to which SA had to report.^
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The wrangling continued until in a landmark GA Resolution, 1514 (XV), the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
was passed by the GA on 14 December, 1960, setting the f ram work within which 
the UN would seek to advance the issue of Namibia's independence.
A measure of South Africa's total disregard for the international moves being 
made, was the fact that in 1962 South Africa set up the "Odendaal Commission" 
which, in its 1964 report, detailed SA's plans for a bantustan division of 
Namibia.
Pretoria totally disregarded the UN General Assembly's demands and the 
advisory opinion of the ICJ. Consequently, the GA through Resolution 2145 
(1966) found that South Africa had "disavowed the Mandate" as it had "failed 
to fulfill its obligations in respect of the mandated territory" and that
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"henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the
4United Nations".
The UN Security Council (SC) which had remained aloof from this issue due to 
the attitudes of the Western powers, entered the fray in January 1963 by 
unanimously condemning the trial of the 37 Namibians in Pretoria. SA ignored 
the SC’s demand that they stop the trial, free those involved and repatriate 
them to Namibia. Instead it proceeded with a second trial and began 
implementing the bantustan policy by enacting the "Development of Self 
Government for Native Nations Act", No.54 (1968) and the "South West Africa 
Affairs Act", No.25 (1969).5
Not even South Africa's allies in the SC could defend this, so on 20 March, 
1969 the SC adopted Resolution 264 declaring South Africa's presence in
Namibia to be illegal and contrary to the principles and decisons of the
United Nations. Five months later, on 12 August, 1969 the Security Council
reiterated the position expressed in Res. 264(1969) but this time injected a
time limit demanding that SA withdraw its administration by the 4th October,
1969.^ During this debate the British representative stated what became the
regular position of the three permanent western members of the Security
Council: that they "could not and would not contemplate an economic war with
South Africa and sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the 
7Charter..." which relates to clear and present threats to peace. On numerous 
occasions in subsequent years, Britain, France and the USA would use their 
veto to block the passage of any resolution that called for action, or even 
threatened action, in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.
In 1971 the ICJ delivered its advisory opinion confirming the validity of the
revocation of the Mandate and, therefore, the illegality of South Africa’s
presence in Namibia and the obligation incumbent on all member states of the
UN to "refrain fom any acts" and in particular "any dealings with the
Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending
fe
support or assistance to, such presence and administration". Later that year 
both the C-A and SC accepted the ICJ opinion, the latter in the form of UNSC 
Res. 301 (1971).
The then UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim went to South Africa and
Namibia in March 1972 and in Septemeber 1972 Waldheim sent a special
representative, Dr. Alfred Sscher, to further extend the contacts with South 
Africa. This too, initiated a technique that SA has since used of seeming to 
negotiate in good faith while simultaneously proceeding undaunted with their
own programme no matter how inconsistent with what is supposedly being
negotiated. In this instance it declared that "Ovamboland" and "Eastern 
Caprivi" would be granted "self-government" in the immediate future as the 
next step in advancing the bantustan division of the country. Later, Pretoria 
was to give the appearance of negotiating seriously regarding UNSC Res. 435 
( 1978), while at the same time going ahead with their own long term programme 
designed to retain and consolidate control over Namibia.
THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP, THE U.N. AND NEGOTIATIONS
The buildup of pressure for coercive action against South Africa came to a 
head again in June 1975 when the Africa Group at the UN presented a draft 
resolution to the Security Council proposing an arms embargo against South 
Africa because its ccntinued illegal occupation of Namibia constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. While on this occasion the three 
Western permanent members of the Security Council, Britain, the United States 
and France, again abused their triple veto to block the resolution, they were 
concerned by the apparent unwillingness of Pretoria even to contemplate a 
neo-colonial solution in Namibia. Without an internationally approved 
solution the Western members of the Security Council could expect increasing 
pressure for sanctions against South Africa.
As a result, UN Security Council Res. 385 was adopted with Western support on 
30 January 1976. It demanded that South Africa withdraw its administration 
from Namibia and that elections under the supervision and control of the UN be 
held, leading to independence for Namibia. In the wake of South Africa’s 
invasion of Angola, Henry Kissinger launched his so-called diplomatic peace 
shuttle in April 1976 as an effort to deflect mounting pressure on the West
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over developments in South Africa. Later in 1976, Britain, France and the 
United States again had to exercise their triple veto to block a resolution 
calling for an arms embargo against South Africa. They could not allow this 
untenable position in which South Africa had placed them of constantly 
appearing as its protectors by veto to continue.
The Ambassadors of the then five Western members of the Security Council 
(United States, Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Canada) met 
with South African Prime Minister Voster, Foreign Minister R. F. Botha, and 
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, on the 7th April, 1977 for 
talks on the future of Namibia. During the course of the next year the 
’Contact Group’ (as they began to call themselves) held many meetings with the 
South African Government, SWAPO and the UN. During this period, Pretoria, 
with typical hypocricy, declared a willingness to co-operate with the Contact 
Group's effort to find a solution within the context of their proposals but at 
the same time proceeded with their bantustan policy by setting up a "Damara 
Legislative Council" and arranging elections for the Rehoboth Gebeit. They 
also sought to promote their puppets in Namibia by insisting on Western 
recognition of them.
Major General J. J. Geldenhuys^ was appointed commanding officer of the 
military occupation of Namibia and was instructed to begin building up tribal 
armies with the objective of eventually forming a supposedly an independant 
Namibian Army. Pretoria appointed an "Administrator General", Marthinus 
Steyn, a Judge of the Orange Free State Division of the Supreme Court, to act 
as a one person colonial government on behalf of the South African Government. 
He took office during September 1977, supposedly in accordance with the 
western proposal that Pretoria make such an appointment for the purpose o:
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ultimately facilitating the implementation of the proposals still being 
formulated. Steyn initiated a review of laws on Namibia, streamlining the 
so-called security legislation and repealing some bits of apartheid 
legislation. Although this was portrayed as a demonstration of South Africa*3 
goodwill, it did not alter the overall effect of Pretoria’s oppressive 
legislation, or the fundamentals of its highly exploitative apartheid system. 
The exercise was undertaken simply to portray an image of reform and deflect 
growing criticism of the regime*s repressive legal structure.
South Africa's declaration that it would not proceed immediately with 
implementing its Turnhalle solution, was hailed as a victory for Western 
diplomacy and a clear demonstration of the progress that was being made in 
spite of the fact that Pretoria permitted the Turnhalle conference to continue 
with its farcical deliberations aimed solely at an internal settlement.
In early January, 1978, 'proximity talks’ were held in New York with the 
Contract Group shuttling between delegations from SWAPO and South Africa, who 
refused to talk to SWAPO directly. Again, as had consistently been the case 
during the preceding months of negotiations, SWAPO was pressured to 
accommodate the demands which Pretoria continuously made. The argument was 
that if SWAPO did not make the concessions, then the whole process would break 
down. The "proximity talks" resumed in early February, 1978 but lasted only 
three days because Pik Botha suddenly left New York, warning that aspects of 
these proposals "would be totally unacceptable and so dangerous that there is 
a serious danger of people in the territory being overrun and being governed 
by a Marxist terrorist organisation...."1^  by which he meant SWAPO.
What became clear from this and other statements by Pretoria was that they
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would under no circumstances accept a SWAPO governemnt in Windhoek. They 
sought to delay a solution and would only ultimately agree to a settlement 
which provided the Pretoria regime with what they perceived as a clear 
opportunity to install a puppet government but with international approval.
On 25 April, 1978 South Africa declared their acceptanoe of the Western 
proposals but on the basis of an interpretation South Africa claimed they had 
received from the western Contact Group. SWAPO and the front line States had, 
of course, been left with a different understanding from that which was 
offered to, or at lest understood by, South Africa. This served to illustrate 
once more a tactic of the Contact Group; they consistently present ambiguous 
proposals capable of being interpreted in diametrically opposite ways. 
Chester Crocker in particular has been termed "the master of deliberate 
ambiguity". Agreement to the text of a particular proposal was then hailed as 
an advance no matter how different the interpretations by the two sides were.
In a savage attempt to dissuade SWAPO from accepting the Western proposals and 
thereby to appear as the intransigent party, Pretoria orderd the bombing of 
the SWAPO settlement at Xassinga in southern Angola on the 4th May, 1978. 
Nearly 800 Namibians - virtually all non-combatants - were murdered in the 
course of that one day by SA forces. However, on 12 July, SWAPO accepted the 
proposals.
Towards the end of July the Security Council considered the Western proposals 
and requested that the Secretary General appoint a "special representative" to 
take the matter further. Martti Ahtisaari, the then UN Commissioner for 
Namibia was appointed to this post and left within a week for Namibia with a 
50 strong UN team in order to determine what arrngements would need to be made
%  * -  12 -
in order to implement the Contact Groups's proposals.
No sooner had the Secretary General reported back to the Security Council than 
South Africa raised objections to the proposals. Botha in a letter11 to Dr. 
Waldheim objected to the size of the 7500 strong military component of UNTAG, 
to the inclusion of a civilian police unit and also insisted that the election 
would have to take place before the end of December 1978, even though, or more 
probably because, this was impossible in terms of the timetable contained in 
the Western Proposals and the Secretary General's report.
In contrast, SWAPO's President, Sam Nujoma ,wrote to the UN Secretary General 
on 9 September, 1978 and offered to sign a ceasefire with South Africa as 
required in the proposals. This offer was promptly rejected by South Africa.
1 ?A few days later, on 20 September Voster anounced Pretoria's intention of 
going ahead with their own internal settlement elections in December 1973, 
effectively rejecting the UN Secretary General's proposals for a settlement. 
Then on 29 September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 (1978) which 
formalised the Security Council's acceptance of the Secretary General's report 
as the universally accepted plan of action for bringing Namibia to 
independence.
The five Contact Group countries, concerned that South Africa's refusal to 
cooperate in the implementation of Res. 435 would bring a sustained demand 
that they agree to mandatory sanctions, took the unprecedented step of sending 
a delegation made up of the foreign ministers of Britain, the United States, 
the rederal Republic of Germany, Canada, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of 
:ranee to South Africa to dissuade Pretoria from proceeding with its "internal
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settlement". The "five" had begged and pleaded in the Security Council that 
they be given the opportunity to persuade South Africa to cooperate in the 
implementaion of Res. 435. At the end of their meetings in Pretoria they had 
quite evidently not succeeded but they made great play of the fact that 
Pretoria had not explicitly rejected Res. 435. The logic of this position was 
that there was still hope of South Africa agreeing to implementation of the 
Resolution, and that, providing no one rocked the boat by demanding sanctions 
against South Africa, that objective could still be achieved. J
SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACHES TO A NEO-COLONIAL ' SOLUTION'
It is clear that Pretoria has never had the remotest intention of allowing 
Namibia to become genuinely independent. But the evidence suggests that their 
regime was at this point seriously considering the offer being made to it at 
the time by the Contact Group. They were, it seems, considering the 
possiblility of Res. 435 eventually offering them a means of securing 
continued domination of Namibia but with the UN off their back and SWAPO's 
struggle seriously undermined for years to come. To achieve this Pretoria 
believed it needed further time: (a) to build up what they hoped would prove 
an attractive alternative to SWAPO, (b) to establish an administration, army 
and police which was ostensibly Namibian but loyal to the South African rgime, 
so that when the time came for independence they would be able to leave a 
state apparatus in place on the ground, creating major difficulties for any 
incoming government opposed to the South African regime and (c) to experiment 
in literally buying out a population during an election process.
This last element took the form of the December 1978 "election" in Namibia and
- 14 -
the carbon copy of that election in Zimbabwe in March of 1979. SWAPO
boycotted that December election. Pretoria spared nothing - lavish parties
1 üwere laid on for everyone who came to DTA rallies with free steaks and beer 
available for all, This was meant to signal to the masses of the population 
how life was going to be different with a DTA government in Windheok.
As a result of coercion, legal compulsion, plain bullying tactics, and an
15enormous propaganda drive, Pretoria achieved the results it was looking for.
The regime claimed a 92% registration of voters and an 80Í turnout of those 
registered to vote. The DTA took 41 of the 50 seats, AKTUR (the National 
Party) won 6 seats and one seat each went to three smaller groups. Pretoria 
was well pleased.
The "election1’ in Zimbabwe in March 1979 was quite evidently heavily 
influenced by South Africa with very much the same style and lavish 
expenditure everywhere. This Zimbabwe experiment produced the same sort of 
pleasing results for Pretoria.
Judging from the inspired articles which appeared in the press in South 
Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe at that time, pretoria was working on the theory 
that the prestige of holding government office would enhance puppets’ chances 
of victory in any later election. Thus when the Lancaster House settlement 
was proposed, Pretoria agreed to put the pressure on Smith and Muzorewa by 
threatening the withdrawal of supplies from South Africa. They had convinced 
themselves that the March 1979 Zimbabwe election results could be repeated in 
the independence election. Indeed they were sc sure of the outcome that they 
had made arrangements for their 'Chief Minister’ in Namibia, Dirk Mudge, to 
fly to Salisbury (as it then was) to meet ’Prime Minister' Muzorewa the
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morning after his election ’triumph'. The actual outcome stunned Pretoria not 
simply in respect to the future of Zimbabwe but also in its implications for 
Namibia.
Throughout 1979 and 1980 South Africa raised one objection after the other to 
Resolution 435. Pretoria objected to the presence of SWAPO bases in Namibia 
and demanded the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring states. They 
demanded that their puppets, the "internal parties" (defined to exclude SWAPO 
- which existed as a legal party in Namibia - and any other party - e.g. 
SWANU, Dañara Council - not willing to appear under a South African/Turnhalle 
umbrella) be included as parties to the negotiations and that all UN funding 
should stop going to SWAPO. They also had the arrogance to propose that 
UNITA, their clients in Angola, be included in the negotiations. Time after 
time it was SWAPO which had to make concessions in the hope of being able to 
begin implementation of the UN election plan. During August 1980 the South 
Africans wrote to the UN Secretary general claiming that they now only had two 
remaining difficulties preventing implementation: one was the partiality of 
the UN towards SWAPO and the other that their puppets had not been consulted 
sufficiently. The Contact Group then proposed that an all-parties 
"Pre-implementation" meeting" take place in Geneva. This meeting took place 
in January 1931. It was apparent from the start that the South African regime 
had only agreed to the meeting because they believed that they could turn it 
into an international exhibition of their puppets, SWAPO immediately declared 
its willingness to cooperate in the implementation of Resolution 435 and sign 
a cease-fire as the first essential step. South Africa refused to do so, 
railed in its attempt to turn it into a propaganda coup for themselves and 
caused the meeting to break dowm before its scheduled end.
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The breakdown of the Geneva meeting was only to be expected. The Pretoria
government knew that the incoming Reagan administration would be considerably
more sympathetic to the maintenance of the existing apartheid system and state
at home and to the conditions it would demand for a settlement in Namibia.
From the start the new US administration sent all the signals Pretoria was
hoping for. Reagan in a TV interview not long after his inauguration
described South Africa as a "friendly country" and then took up a theme much
favoured by Pretoria: that SSA was "a country that strategically is essential
16to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have" . 
Five senior SA military officers were permitted to visit the US during March 
1981 (the first known to have done so in several years) despite the mandatory 
arms embargo and established US policy disallowing such visits. That same 
month a DTA delegation visited Washington, senior State Department officials 
met with Jonas Savimbi, leader of Pretoria’s client Angolan army and the 
adminsitration attempted to repeal the Clark Amendment which applies only to 
Angola and expressly forbids CIA support for anti-government groups there - a 
repeal they finally achieved in the summer of 1985. The signals to Pretoria 
could not have been stronger or more pleasing to that regime.
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN OPERATION
During the course of frequent discussions in the ensuing months between SA and 
the US, the US Government sought to identify and accommodate SA's "bottom 
line", a comprehensive statement of all demands, which, if satisfactorily met, 
would make it possible for Pretoria to agree to implement a suitably revised 
Res. 435. The essence of the US position was that: Res. 435 needed to be so 
changed as to make it be seen once again by Pretoria as a vehicle for
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attaining continued domination of Namibia. It would need to have fundamental 
aspects changed and Pretoria would need the opportunity to re-shape internal 
circumstances so as to make nonsense of key aspects of the Resolution.
Confidential State Department memoranda relating to the April 1981 visit of R.
F. Botha and Magnus Milan, SA's Foreign and Defence Ministers respectively,
which were leaked to the American press in May of 1981, offer a valuable
insight into the direction of the new US administration’s Southern Africa 
17policy. They appeared to accept Pretoria's ideas about Namibia and Angola 
giving the US (with South Africa's enthusiastic assistance) the opportunity of 
'’rolling back Soviet influence in Africa”. It fitted neatly into their 
cold-war analysis and offered an issue, getting rid of Cubans from Angola, 
which would have electoral appeal in the US. They were also proposing changes 
in Res. 435: SA wanted to avoid elections for a constituent assembly and to 
get rid of as much UN involvement as possible. They made it clear to the US 
Adminstration that they did not want an effective SWAPO government in 
Windhoek. Only a puppet administration would do.
Open campaigning for "changes” in Res. 435 was short lived because formally
"changing" it presented political problems to other members of the Contract 
1 8Group 1 who otherwise supported the US approach and welcomed the US taking the
lead of the Contact Group. A State Department briefing written for Chester 
19Crocker referred to a "semantical" problem: the alterations they sought
should be referred to as "attemos to complement rather than to change 435". 
In the event they referred to these attempts to undermine Res. 435 as 
"strengthening" the resolution. No longer was reference made to a settlement 
m  terms of Res, 435 but rather on the basis of Res. 435 suggesting that the 
Resolution should merely serve as the basic guide to a settlement, and could
9* 4
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be altered by further agreements and interpretations.
The argument was put forward that if Pretoria was to be persuaded that Res. 
435 should be implemented, then South Africa’s ’concerns" with the Resolution 
and with "regional security" would have to be met. There was no question of 
forcing an intransigent South Africa to agree to implementation. On the
p
contrary, the whole direction was toward making Res. 435 once again acceptable 
to Pretoria, which meant so altering it that it would again be perceived by 
Pretoria as providing it with a means of retaining effective control of a 
nominally independent Namibia.
The logic of this approach was that all concessions would have to be made by 
SWAPO. The other aspect was that re-opening negotiations would provide 
Pretoria and her allies with the legitimised delay which SA needed to reshape 
circumstances within Namibia. Pretoria’s objective was to make nonsense of 
fundamental aspects of the Resolution and lay the foundations for continued 
economic and political dominance and/or massive destabilisation in Namibia and 
for its use as a base for continued coercion and aggression against Namibia's 
neigbours in the future.
At the end of March 1981, the US State Department announced that it had 
completed its Southern Africa policy review. This initiated a flurry of 
diplomatic activity, a significant feature of which was that Pretoria confined 
its discussions on Namibia to the Reagan administration, abruptly ceasing 
direct contact with the Contact Group as a whole. The consistent pattern was 
for all negotiations with Pretoria to be conducted though the US State 
Department. The other four members of the Contact Group acquiesced in thus. 
Further evidence of this compliance with US demands by the other contract
*»
- 19-
group countries was demonstrated when Britain and France joined the US in
vetoing four resolutions calling for sanctions against SA in the UN Security
PDCouncil at the end of April 1981. Britain and France were reportedly 
unhappy at the US refusal to work out a compromise resolution reaffirming a 
commitment to Res. 435. They were nevertheless ready to support the US with 
their vetos so that the US would not be isolated. The truth of the matter is 
that in spite of the niceties of diplomatic style, the rest of the Contact 
Group remained committed to the US line of appeasing the Pretoria regime and 
protecting the profitability of their own economic involvement in racist 
exploitation in Southern Africa.
During the visit of Wiilaim Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, and Chester
Crocker to SA in June 1981, the US offered SA an extra condition for the
implementation of Res. 435, namely the removal of Cuban troops from Angola,
21the so-called ,!linkage, issue. Naturally Pretoria jumped at this, and
together with the US have since insisted on this condition. The remainder of 
the Contact Group have justified their support for linkage by saying that 
while they do not support a formal linkage, it is-» vital to recognise the
I
reality of SA’s security concerns in the region. Without satisfying these
demands, SA will not agree to Res. 435. The introduction of the "linkage”
22issue nas since been condemned in the Security Council Res. 539 ( 1983) in 
which the US abstained. The Resolution passed through the Security Council 
because of the enormous opposition among the vast majoirty of UN member states 
to delaying Namibia's independence through the introduction of an issue quite 
extraneous to Res. 435 and inherently contradictory since were South Africa 
not illegally in occupation of Namibia no event in Angola could significantly 
affec^ oA security. it appears the diplomatic pressure was such that the US 
rel^ unable to use its veto, apparently much to the alarm of the SA delegation
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observing the proceedings in the Security Council. It has been quite clear 
that the US has wanted a Cuban withdrawal because of the domestic appeal it 
would have in the US. The Reagan administrtion knows perfectly well that the 
Cubans were invited to Angola during the 1975/6 South African invasion of that 
country and that they have only stayed, at the request of the Angolan 
government, because of the continuing direct and prcxy (UNITA) acts of 
aggression by South Africa. They know that the Angolan refusal to agree to 
linkage is entirely justified. Yet President Reagan himself was drawn into 
the issue as a signal of prioritsation by the United States. In September 
1981 he wrote to President Nyerere, as chairman of the FLS, insisting that the 
withdrawal of Cubans from Angola was a necessary prerequisite to the 
implementation of the UN election plan.
During October 1981 the US, with the rest of the Contact Group in train, began
their "phased approach" to achieving implementation of Res. 435. The whole
exercise amounted to an outrageous attempt to squeeze further concessions from
SWAPO and to undermine Res. 435. On 26 October, the Contact Group produced
their "constitutional principles"^ which, quite apart from details of the
content, was an attempt to limit the freedom of the Constituent Assembly to be
elected in terms of Res. 435 in deciding a constitution for an independent
Namibia. It also introduced a new factor, the need for the constitution to be
24decided by a two thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly ’, whereas the 
need for a simple majority had previously been understood, although not
specifically defined in the Resolution. One of the basic principles of Res. 
435 was that it should first be established who the true representatives of
the Namibian people are, so that they could then be given the opportunity to
agree on a constitution. This was clearly an attempt to undermine a
pr
fundamental aspect of the Resolution. SWAPO/FLS responded 3 by reformulating
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the Contact Group’s proposal from which the five interpreted SWAPO’s
agreement. In effect, the reply also re-affirmed the principle that the
Constituent Assembly was ultimately responsible for whatever decisons were
made regarding the constitution. Notably, a reference to "regional”
administration, evidently included by the Contact Group to satisfy SA that its
bantustan division of the country will be maintained, was excluded from the 
26response.
Likewise, the Five's attempt to float the idea of a ”non-agression" treaty
27between SWAPO and SA was ignored as a non-starter. Pretoria’s response to
the Five's proposals were never made public. On 17 December, 1981 the
P P iContract Group issued their revised proposals and in them suggested a
relatively complicated two votes per person electoral system with half the
constituent assembly being elected on a constituency basis and half on the
basis of proportional representation. This proposal was rejected by SWAPO2  ^
20and by the FLS" . It was eventually agreed by SWAPO/FLS in June 1982 to 
shelve the voting system for later resolution.
*
The Contact Group eventually leaked their ’summary of points” in early June
O 1
1982 in preparation for "proximity" talks in New York during that period 
This document included a paragraph on "other regional issues" which, without 
using the terms "linkage" or "Cubans” or "Angola”, gave unmistakable 
endorsement to the US/SA demand for linkage.^2 It clearly provided Pretoria 
with a legitimisation of its linkage demand as being a necessary prerequisite 
to a settlement.
It is this issue which has remained the ostensible stumbling block to a 
settlement, the excuse regularly used for the delay in implementing Res, 435.
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RESHUFFLING THE PUPPET SHOW
By September 1982, the then "Council of Ministers" and "National Assembly" 
reached the end of their terms of office. Although the SA regime is adept at 
extending terms of office when it suits them, the level of corruption and 
chaos of its excessively expensive government bureaucracy was becoming too 
much even for Pretoria. In addition Pretoria was having to deal with a rising
GOlevel of complaints from the ultra-conservative National Party in Namibia , 
that the DTA administration was not representative enough as it did not 
include themselves. Attempts were made administratively to "broaden" the 
"Council of Ministers" but when that failed Pretoria declared at the beginning 
of 1983 that it was going to return Namibia to the one person rule of the 
colonial governor (Administrator General).
f
34In July 1 9 8 3 Pretoria announced with all the ceremony of an official gazette 
their intention of setting up a "State Council". It was to have the function 
of drawing up a constitution for an independent Namibia which would then be 
put to a referendum, of course, under SA control. This "State Council" never 
materislised because of the advent of the "Multi-Party Conference" (MPC), a 
group of small political parties which included the DTA and the National 
Party. By the end of 1983 two of these eight parties (the Damara Council and 
the Christian Democratic Party) had withdrawn from the MPC declaring that they 
did not wish to collaborate in what was basically an anti-SWAPO front funded 
anonymously by the South Africans through a West German source. During 1984 
SWANU also withdrew for the same reason from the MPC.^^
Pretoria initially took a low profile with the MPC but by January 1984 it had
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declared a public position. The colonial governor, the Administrator General, 
declared in his 1984 New Year’s message that the SA Government was ’pinning 
its hopes” on the MPC^°. A couple of weeks later the MPC was summoned by P.
W. Botha to Cape Town-"^  to be told that they were to agree a concrete
alternative to the implementation of Resolution 435.
During 1984 Pretoria attempted to persuade SWAPO to become part of its puppet
-government in Namibia. The idea was floated at the May Lusaka conference 
between SA and SWAPO (each accompanied by Namibian groups) hosted by President 
Kaunda and again at a meeting on Cape Verde in July 1984 between SWAPO and the
O O
Pretoria regime-5 . The argument was presented by Pretoria as follows: South 
Africa, like the rest of the world, would like Res. 435 implemented, but it 
seemed impossible in the foreseeable future due to the unfortunate presence of 
the Cuban forces in Angola. The Namibian people should not, however, continue 
to be frustrated in their political aspirations and so the SA government 
wished to see the establishment of a "Government of National Unity” which 
would include SWAPO’s participation. SWAPO would, of course, have to lay down 
its arms while South Africa's military forces, police and administration would 
remain in place. In other words they were proposing to SWAPO that it become 
part of their puppet government in Windhoek thereby legitimising their 
continued illegal occupation.
Pretoria's proposal seems so arrogant, outrageous and inherently unlikely to 
attract o^APO, that to the outsider it may appear that they could not have 
meant it. This is not the case. Consistent with their racist attitudes, 
Pretoria thought that SWAPO may fall for their tricks and that it was worth a 
try. If they did not succeed, they would lose nothing. They would simply 
project SWAPO's refusal to cooperate as SWAPO rejecting their offers of peace
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and a "negotiated settlement". If they could persuade SWAPO to participate, 
they would effectively legitimise their illegal occupation of Namibia, 
neutralise SWAPO’s ability to continue the armed struggle and have SWAPO 
functioning as their puppet government in Namibia.
By the end of 1984, Pretoria had the MPC threatening to "negotiate a
-30settlement" with South Africa with or without SWAPO^7 knowing perfectly well
that SWAPO could not and would not be drawn into their game. In January 1985,
the existence of committees of senior SA civil servants working on a
40"settlement proposal" was leaked to the press and eventually on the 26
March, 1985 the MPC flew to Cape Town to present to P. W. Botha, now SA's
41President, what were ostensibly their own proposals for an "interim
42government of national unity". In "response" P. W. Botha announced on 18 
April the establishment of an "interim government" made up of an appointed 
"Council of Ministers", "National Assembly" and "Constitutional Council". 
Those in these bodies would all be members of the MPC.
Remarks made a few days later by Pik Botha in the so-called "House of
» . 4-3Representatives" underline Pretoria's true intentions :
"....South Africa has made it clear to the West and the world that 
it has the right to, unilaterally, terminate its presence and 
administration in South West Africa. I don’t say we will do it or
that it is under consideration at this moment, but it is an
option."
From the substantial circumstantial evidence that has accrued, particularly 
that relating to the establishment of specifically "Namibian" state
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structures, it would seem that this is the solution Pretoria is now aiming at. 
It is going through the process of establishing an undeclared, creeping UDI in 
Namibia. It may well announce at some future point that the entire world has 
got it wrong and that South Africa simply no longer occupies Namibia. This 
would avoid an antagonising declaration such as Ian Smith’s declaration of UDI 
in 1965 but rather present it as a fait accompli. Proposed transfers of major 
economic assets including the loss making railways and the shareholding of the 
South African Industrial Development Corporation in Rossing, also point in 
this direction.
Ultimately Pretoria’s capacity is severely limited by the fundamental weakness 
of its position. The regime may entertain all sorts of ambitious schemes to 
ensure its survival but lacks the capacity to carry its schemes through.
Without either a means to discredit SWAPO by inducing it to collaborate or to 
build/buy a countervailing black Namibian client base no nec-colcnial 
structures can be made to appear credibly non-SA.
FROM POLICE PRESENCE TOWARD NEO-COLONIAL COMMAND
The primary vehicle South Africa has used to impose and retain its domination
of Namibia has been the use of force. Armed suppression has been a constant
feature of life in Namibia during the past century. It has had as its primary 
objective the establishing of the white settler community as the indisputable 
rulers of Namibia. While SA is now much more concerned about SA (than
settler) white interests it still requires a ’local' white presence to operate 
them. German colonisation was marked by the extermination of some 80% of the 
population of the central and southern regions. The South Africans have been
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equally ready to use brute force in an attempt to stem the rejection of their 
control. It was in response to this violent suppression of its efforts to 
mobilise the Namibian people that SWAPO decided to take up arms against the 
Pretoria regime.
As a result of a decision of the 1961 National Congress of SWAPO held in
Windhoek, cadres were recruited and sent abroad for military training. The
Congress took the view that armed struggle was compatible with and
complementary to the political struggle. But it was not until 1966 that the
armed struggle was actually launched. On 18 July that year the International
Court of Justice announced that it did not recognise the competence of
44Ethiopia and liberia to bring a case before it on Namibia and therefore
would not pronounce itself on the issue. That same day SWAPO issued a
resolute statement from its provisional headquarters in Dar es Salaam,
declaring that the ICJ’s inexcusable refusal to act "would relieve Namibians
once and for all from any illusions which they may have harboured about the
United Nations as some kind of saviour in their plight". The statement then
declared that SWAPO had "no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about 
45our liberation" . A little more than a month later on 26 August 1966, SWAPO 
fighters engaged South African forces in battle. From then on SWAPO has 
consistently escalated the armed struggle, forcing the South African regime to 
commit an increasing number of men and arms to retain its colonial occupation.
In spite of the undoubted gains of the armed struggle and the influence it has 
had in focusing world .attention on Namibia, without which there would never 
have been negotiations, it is not the objective of this study to examine these 
gains but rather to look critically at how Pretoria is preparing Namibia for 
destabilisation in the future and how the SA regime thus constitutes a threat
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to the region. The focus is quite deliberately on the negative - the threats 
and dangers which Namibia is likely to face through future destabilisation.
During the first years of the conflict, the SA Police were formally 
responsible for attempting to contain SWAPO’s military wing. Although the SA 
military had three major military bases and five airports at its disposal in 
Namibia at the time SWAPO launched the armed struggle, it was not until the 
crushing of the 1971-1972 general strike in Namibia that the military took 
over formally and embarked upon a massive military buildup so that by 1974 SA 
troop strength in Namibia had grown to some 15,000, then 45,000 by 1976 
following the SA defeat in Angola, 80,000 by 1980 and between 100,000 and
110,000 by 1985. These figures, especially in later years include mercenary, 
UNITA and SWA Territorial Force Cadres which are in fact - if not necessarily 
in name - part of the overall SA military command structure. Since taking 
overall control of SA’s military machine in Namibia in 1972, the SA military 
has continued joint operations with the South African police, referring to 
both forces as the ’security forces”. Over the years, the regime has resorted 
to nakedly vicious terror tactics in their attempt to suppress the political 
opposition of the Namibian people to their presence in the country. Torture, 
"disappearances” following arrest, 3avage murders and detention are the 
standard practice of these so-called security forces.
Namibia occupies a peculiar position in South Africa’s regional strategy in 
that, as a colony it illegally occupies, it currently exercises total 
domination including de facto (illegal) sovereignty but is under considerable 
pressure to relinquish control. Realising that it will inevitably be forced 
at some stage to accept some form of internationally acceptable settlement 
(despite its avoidance tactics over 435) it has undertaken a definite
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programme to prepare for its continued domination of Namibia through the 
establishment of a neo-colonial administration. Should a SWAPO government 
emerge to challenge its domination, Pretoria is laying the groundwork for 
Namibia’s destabilisation in an attempt to reassert the domination it wishes 
to exercise in the region. In this context it is instructive to examine how 
the SA military machine in Namibia has changed in its composition since the 
negotiations which led to Res. 435 began in 1977.
Within two years of the military taking over control of the occupation of
Namibia the first black ’ethnic” units were formed in Namibia. In 1974 a San
unit, now known as 201 Battalion was established. In 1975 101 Battalion was
46formed in ’Ovamboland” and 202 Battalion in ’Kavango” . During 1976 "ethnic”
units were set up in Rehoboth and Caprivi and in 1979 training courses began
for recruits from among the Damara, Nama, Herero, Tswana and Coloured
"population groups". In 1979 the SA military Paratus revealed the existence
47of a unit in Kaokoland.
48It was, however, in 1977, that Pretoria's plan to "Namibianise" the war
first began to emerge in a coherent form. Major General Geldenhuys was
appointed the Officer Commanding the SWA Command. He was charged with the
task of building up a "multi-racial defence force” in Namibia and as a result
41 Battalion, now known as 911 Battalion, was formed and included recruits
from all "population groups”. On 1 August, 1980 the South West Africa
Territory force (3WATF) was established bringing these units together with a
49number of SADF units, battalions, field regiments and area forces.
SWA7F was given its own formal command structure: ranks used are a little
different from those used in the SADF and SWATF received its own distinctive
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iniforms so as to give it the appearance of a force separate from the SADF.
Military communiques issued in Windhoek are now always issued by SWATF and not
the SADF. This, however, is an obfuscation of the fact that SWATF remains an
integral part of South Africa's military machine with Pretoria remaining in
50overall command and retaining control of its entire functioning.
At the same time SWATF was set up in 1980, the then commander of SA forces in
Namibia, Major General Geldenhuys, made it clear that Pretoria envisaged that
the time would come when the SADF would no longer be needed in Namibia as
SWATF would be capable of taking over its role. He also made it clear at the
time that SADF units would be "seconded" to SWATF at the request of the
51"independent" Government in Namibia.
SWATF has been set up as if it were and with the intent of creating a fully 
fledged "SWA" army. It incorporates a command infrastructure, a permanent 
force infantry component, a citizen force, a commando network comprising 25 
area force units, a training wing and an administrative and logistics 
component. Jhe "airforce" currently consists of a light aircraft commando; 
the privately owned aircraft are flown by their owners on a part-time basis.
In 1982 the then Officer Commanding SWATF, Major General Charles Lloyd, spelt
out hew SA saw the position of SWATF in the event of Res. 435 being
implemented. The essence of what he stated was that SWATF would be partially
demobilised for a temporary period during implementation but not fully
dismantled as required by Res. 435. It would retain its command structure,
52oases, weapons and capacity to be fully mobilised within hours. By creating 
SWATF subsequent to the passage of Res. 435 in the Security Council, Pretoria 
clearly hopes to make utter nonsense of the fundamental principle in Res. 435
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that all 3A forces in Namibia must be withdrawn, bar the 1500 who would remain 
confined to two bases for the transitional period. SWATF is an integral part 
of the South African forces in Namibia. The obvious intention of Pretoria was 
to have a military force in Namibia which is ostensibly Namibian even if it is 
commanded, equipped and supplied by Pretoria and owes allegiance to its South 
African master. In the longer term SA probably did hope SWATF could be 
virtually totally locally staffed, largely locally financed and backed and run 
by SA less overtly and ubiquitiously than at present. The goal was and is a 
neo-colonial army for a neo-colonial state.
Apart from SWATF the Pretoria regime has developed a motley collection of 
'’special” unconventional units, some of which are used specifically in Namibia 
while others are used more widely than in Namibia alone. Although they 
operate in great secrecy, it is known that the same process of making them 
ostensibly Namibian is in progress.
Koevoet (crowbar) is the most notorious of these units, responsible for many 
brutal murders and the extensive use of torture. Recently officially 
"disbanded”, it has basically been transferred from the South African Police 
to the "South West African Police”, with a formal change of name although it 
seems that it will be unable to shake off the name "Koevoet” in practice.
The person Pretoria - in an extreme case of its standard ’double speak’ -
calls its Law and Order Minister, Louis la Grange, announced in May 1985 that
members of the South African Police who are members of Keovoet or the
"security police” would be "seconded or transferred to the South West African 
5RPolice" J and that the SWAP would expand its "counter insurgency" function. 
This serves to illustrate the method Pretoria is using to "Namibianise" its
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name and its identification as a Namibian unit.
While Koevoet is technically designated a polic unit, it is in fact the
cutting edge of the SA military in Namibia. It functions as a military unit
and has never had anything other than a military function, operating in much
the same way as the Selous Scouts did in pre-independence Zimbabwe. The
obvious reason Pretoria had for technically designating it as a police unit is
in order to circumvent a fundamental element of Res. 435, when Pretoria is
eventually forced to implement the UN election plan. Res. 435 makes provision
for the withdrawal of all SA forces from Namibia, bar 1500, to be confined to
two bases for the transition period, the total disbanding of all
"ethnic’Vtribal units but also provides for "the existing police force"
54maintaining law and order during the transition period . As a "police" unit, 
Pretoria can be expected to argue that Koevoet units will remain operational 
during the transition period. This type of deception by Pretoria should be 
firmly dealt with by the United Nations. The SWA Special Task Force is also 
technically a police unit presumably for the same reason as stated above. It 
too is a brutalised, professional military unit into which it would appear 
Pretoria is transferring members of Koevoet.
The so-called reconnaissance commandos, the "recces" in the SA military
jargon, constitute another element of Pretoria’s army of occupation in
Namibia. There are known to be six such commandos based at secret locations
in South Africa. They are highly trained troops and operate in great secrecy,
mainly in destabilisation operations in neighbouring states. The unit
ambushed in Cabinda by FAPLA forces on the Jan, 1985, while endeavouring to
55blow up the Petroangol/Gulf Oil refinery masquerading as a UNITA commando, 
was a Durban based "recce commando". These units are also known to operate in
•  %
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Namibia.
32 Battalion is a very large mercenary force made up largely of the remnants
of UNITA and the FNLA as well as black Mozambican ex-merabers of such
Portuguese para military units as Fleche (Arrow) but are led by a white
officer corps of SA Permanent Force members and mercenaries. It is widely
held that they are 32 Battalion while at rear bases or operating in Namibia
56and UNITA while operating in Angola. 44 Battalion has its origins in the 
recruitment by SA of members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry when Zimbabwe 
became independent in 1980. It is primarily deployed in so-called follow-up 
operations. The SWA Specialists undertake tracking using San trackers and 
dogs including pack hounds. They make quite extensive use of scrambler 
motorcycles and horses in their operations. It can be expected that any of 
these units not yet falling under SWATF will be transferred within the next 
couple of years. Clearly Pretoria's objective is to impose on Namibia state 
military and police structures loyal to themselves as part of their programme 
to retain effective control of Namibia even after Res. 435 has been 
implemented.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OCCUPATION: FROM BONANZA TO BURDEND'
From the pre-colonial neoclassical mercantile exploitation of Namibia to the 
present its economic history has been characterised by intensive and brutal 
exploitation of natural resources and of Namibians in the colloquial and in 
the technical senses. While this underlying reality has remained constant, 
the forms and mechanisms of exploitation have varied substantially and the net 
surpluses extracted by the exploiting enterprises and the costs of maintaining
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that structure of exploitation to the occupying state have fluctuated 
enormously.
Until the late 1940s Namibia was relatively economically insignificant. Its 
economy - from early German occupation on - was built around settler ranching, 
hardrock mining, alluvial diamonds and fishing, but none was large absolutely 
or relative to global or regional production. The creation of a labour 
reserve system with sub-subsistence agriculture/ranching in reserves 
subsidising internal, male migrant contract labour did indeed provide cheap 
labour, but Namibian ranching and mining stll rarely did much more than break 
even. Diamonds were at times an exception, but until the post war period 
control of the Oranjemund deposits was used by the De Beers group more as a 
means of controlling world supply (with Oranjemund the ’swing' mine and on 
occasion totally closed) than as a source of profits in and of itself.
Both for Imperial Germany and for South Africa until the 1940s the costs of 
occupation, including frequent military and police action up to the 1930s as 
well as subsidising settlers - were substantial relative to exports and 
profits. Viewed from a macro economic perspective Namibia did make a net 
foreign exchange contribution and provided/protected profits of certain 
enterprises but was a net drain on government resources. This cost, like the 
gains, was fairly small absolutely and relative to total German or South 
African budgets because Namibia was small.
NAMIBIA PAYS OFF
From the late 1940s through the mid-1970s Namibia’s economic importance and
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contribution to South Africa, to enterprises and to settlers increased
markedly. Gross Domestic Product which had varied from R 13 million in 1920
to 3-8 million in 1933, 10.4 million in 1940 and 22.2 million in 1946 in
current prices - i.e. at best regaining 1920 (or pre-1914) real levels in the
mid-1940s - rose rapidly, if erratically, to the order of R 1,100 million
(over R 1000 per capita assuming a true population of 1,035,000) in 1977.
Even allowing for price changes, the compound real growth rate for three
6 8decades exceeded 5% a year.
Namibia became very profitable indeed - for settlers, expatriates, large
enterprises and the South African economy and state. Estimates on GDP
including Walvis Bay and subsistence production show a 1977 GDP of the order
of R 1,075 - 1,135 miilion. Within that expatriate and settler salaries and
profits totaled R 300 - 450 million and corporate operating surpluses plus
depreciation plus profits taxes R 450 - 675 million or R 900 - 975 million
total. The 35,000 economically active white residents averaged R 9,000 -
12,000 incomes. Corporate profits, remittances (R 125 - 300 million according
to varying very imperfect estimates) and - to a lesser extent - new investment 
59were high.
For the South African government the gains and costs - or more accurately the 
extent of net gains - are hard to estimate because of a plethora of 
overlapping budgets, conflation of recurrent and capital account and the 
somewhat odd treatment of the analogue to customs duty as an external transfer 
payment. By 1977 it would appear that RSA and its public utilities broke even 
on recurrent account in Namibia (the inward remittance being the analogue to 
customs and excise), a position which also applies to the 1970s taken as a 
decade. Public sector capital investment was largely brought in on loan from
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RSA (or by reduction of previous reserves) but given recurrent budget balance
(including debt service) it is somewhat artificial to treat this as a cash
60flow 'loss' on South African state 'Namibian operations'.
The main macro economic gain to South Africa from Namibia was on external 
account. By 1977 exports were of the order of R 750 million. Imports from 
and remittances to South Africa were of the order of R 550 million. Adjusting 
for transfer payments on account of customs and excise and capital inflows 
from South Africa and from third countries still gives a net foreign exchange 
gain (earnings from exports to third countries and savings of foreign exchange 
in RSA imports from Namibia - some but not all of below world market prices - 
rather than third countries) of the order of R 500 million. As South Africa's 
own growth has consistently been foreign exchange constrained except at the 
top of gold booms, this was a very major gain indeed - one probably supporting 
a South African gross domestic product 10% larger than it could have beeen in 
the absence of net external balance gains from Namibia.^
Throughout this period the political economy of Namibia remained grossly 
exploitative, unequal and racist. In all probability real per capita African 
income delined over 1945-75; at best it was stagnant despite the overall, 
white and enterprise economic booms.
The majority of the African population was confined to 'reserves' in which 
subsistence could not be earned so that starving and accepting low wage 
contract (whether formally or de facto) jobs from white employers were the 
only real options. In respect to ranching, fish and meat processing, domestic 
service and unskilled private sector government employment (over 80í of 
African wage employment and taken together with the 'residual' economy of the
reserves accounting for 90% of economically active African persons) low wages 
- even allowing for payment in kind - remained critical to sectoral viability. 
Ranching in particular, allowing for implicit salaries to proprietors showed a 
negligible return on investment at best and a loss in most years even at wages 
inadequate even for single employees.
In respect to mining - at least in major mines such as Oranjemund (diamonds), 
the Tsumeb group (base metals) and Rossing (uranium oxide) real wages had 
begun to rise as they had in ether sectors using complex techniques and 
needing a relatively stable, skilled labour force. With this shift came an 
erosion of the pure contract labour system, at least in the sense that workers 
returned regularly to the same employer. However, these shifts in production 
organisation had not gone far and most of the semi-skilled and skilled jobs 
not held by whites had in fact gone to the Cape Coloured community so African 
working class differentiation was still relatively limited.
Namibia as of 1977 was the most racially inegalitarian economy in the world. 
Per capita white income exceeded R 3000, that for African and coloured 
Namibians was about R 125 -150 a gap of 20 -25 to 1 (vs. about 12 to 15 to 1 
in South Africa and slightly less in Rhodesia). African reserve household 
incomes have been estimated at under R 100 per year and those of white salary 
earners/small proprietors in excess of R 10,000 - a differential of 100 to 1. 
The cleavage on strict racial lines between amenity to affluence and 
domination of production and work relations on the white side and poverty to 
penury and subjigation in production and work relations on the block was 
nearly total. The block proto petty bourgeoisie was tiny, the high wage 
labour 'elite' barely emergent and the Cape Coloured intermediate stratum 
narrow in numbers and roles played. ^
1977-1983 DEPRESSION, DEFENCE AND DEFICITS 64
While GDP in current price terms as officially estimated (excluding Waivis Bay 
and subsistence) rose from R 950 million to R 1679 million over 1977-83, in 
constant price terms it fell 8¿2. Excluding general government, GDP fell 192- 
As terms of trade worsened these constant price (physical) figures need to be 
adjusted downward about 15% to take account of territorial purchasing power 
losses. In addition over 1977-83 population rose on the order of 2 0 % .
Per capita GDP in purchasing power terms from 1977 to 1983 fell 352 (42^2 
excluding government). Thus real territorial output per capita in purchasing 
power terms was barely above the real levels of the early 1960s. However, per 
capita real consumption fell only 32 while per capita wages actually rose 20 
to 252 (depending on whether employment was static or fell 52) over the 
1977-83 period, whereas fixed capital formation fell nearly 602 on a constant 
price per capita basis. As real fixed investment in fact peaked in 1975 by 
1983 it was under one third of its 1975 level - the lowest in a quarter 
century. Meanwhile the Recurrent Budget had gone into massive deficit and 
real corporate profits net of depreciation declined sharply (indeed excluding 
Rossing Uranium and Consolidated Diamond Mines had turned negative) and 
ranching sector surpluses to operators had virtually vanished despite a 
variety of increasing subsidy payments probably approaching R 50 million a 
year (or R 10,000 per white rancher).
What had happened? The answer is far from simple and by no means linked 
solely to the liberation struggle and South Africa's defence of its position
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against it. Major factors include:
a. the post 1975 metal price slump (including uranium oxide) which has to 
date showed few signs of ending;
b. De Beers use of Oranjemund as a swing mine with over 50$ output cuts to 
help stabilise the world diamond market;
c. a late 1970s, early 1980s collapse in the karakul price (only reversed 
in 1983-84);
d. the heritage of overfishing (probably exacerbated by natural annual 
cohort size fluctuations) leading to the near collapse of the fishing 
industry;^
e. a devastating semi-permanent drought from 1977 on which has reduced
66real agricultural output and livestock herds up to 75$.
These are not factors unique to Namibia - they are the common coin of 
Sub-Saharan African economies since 1979 (and of mineral producers for 
somewhat longer). However, Namibia - as the almcstj totally preserved real 
consumption and rising real wages per capita (very atypical for S3A over that 
period) indicate - has been in some ways less constrained but per contra has 
also seen real fixed investment per capita dip far more rapidly than has been 
typical.
The special factors affecting the Namibian economy do relate to the liberation
C O
struggle and to the response to it of other actors:
a. major enterprise employers raised real African wages and began to 
create a stratum of semi-skilled wage elite among them (partly to 
reduce costs as white workers were much more expensive and partly to
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secure an African group 'loyal’ to employers);
b. a similar policy in respect to professional and semi-professional
(especially teachers, nurses) personnel by the government was combined 
with what might be termed a "buy a bantustan" strategy of creating 
'Representative Authorities' with well paid politicians, clerks and
home guards and extending some mobility - socially and economically -
to selected members of the African petty ’oourgeoise;
c. massive recurrent and capital (camps, cleared zones on borders, roads
and road improvements) expenditure was incurred to slow the advance of
the guerilla war south from the northern border;
d. despite this war, associated risks and costs rose, e.g. need to move 
fuel by convoy, to use air passenger and freight transport in the 
north, to guard ranches and installations, to repair sabotage damage to 
transport and power links (as far south as the main Van Eck power 
station in Windhoek) and to build a new power line to the Cape to 
supplement the Ruacana Falls dam supply rendered uncertain by the war;
e. leading to increased exodus of ranchers and of other whites - partly
bought off by higher wages and subsidies;
f. and a collapse of enterprise investment as the investors viewed the
military and political risks of putting in new capital (even out of 
territorial profits) as too high until an independence settlement and 
peace emerged.
These factors explain the sharp rise in real wages, the very limited fall in 
average consumption (including rises for non—rancher white and for black 
skilled worker and elite sub-classes), the explosive rise in the recurrent 
budget deficit met partly by RSA transfer increases (largely for a portion of 
military and police spending) and partly by external commercial borrowing
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(largely to virtually totally from South African financial institutions).0^
By the end of the 1982/83 financial year total government spending on 'SWA’ 
account had risen to about R 500 - 950 million of which local revenue plus the 
analogue to customs and excise covered R 420 - 450 million, South African 
transfers R 215 million (R 115 million for the 'territorial' army and police) 
and external borrowing over R 300 million (supposedly two thirds from RSA and 
one third from third country financial institutions albeit that assertion is 
open to doubt). Of the R 750 million odd recurrent spending, R 50 million was 
debt service and R 240 million 'second tier', 'representative authority' - or 
more bluntly bantustan - transfers to bodies which even the RSA appointed 
Thirion Commission found to be monumentally incompetent, wasteful and corrupt.
The RSA state policies did represent the Namibian version of the attempts to 
reorganise production and the sub-class base of the regime and its opponents 
carried on over the same period in the Republic of South Africa (including its 
bantustans). These are real changes in political economic strategy and 
structure including:
a. creating/encouraging other employers to create a substantial (30,000 
odd or a tenth of total wage employment) African/coloured upper wage 
and salary 'elite' sub-class;
b. partly through the creation of well funded (at least for politicians 
and functionaries) bantustans;
c. with parallel opening up of professional and business opportunities for 
'loyal’ black petty bourgeois fragments (they hardly constitute a 
convincing sub-class);
d. and associated ’liberalisaton' of access to services, pass laws, labour
-41-
contracts and trade union organisation;
e. and related efforts to consolidate major enterprise support through 
promises of more incentives and less regulation.
This strategy is not succeeding - partly because of the weakened state of the 
underlying economy since 1977, but also for more basic reasons. The division 
- economically, politically and socially - between black and white remains so 
wide that the 'loyalty’ of the professional and skilled wage/salary elite and 
of at least some business petty bourgeois has not been bought. Further, 
because many employers do not have productivity/income levels high enough to 
pay higher wages and are increasingly unwilling to seek to manage large 
numbers of black workers, both unemployment and differentiation within the 
African employees as well as between them and the 'residual' economy 
households have increased sharply. The unemployment 'problem' has led to 
backdoor reinstitution of residence control. The unwanted energy of labour 
leaders (especially of the SWAPO affiliated National Union of Namibian 
Workers) has led to de facto continuation of the ban on independent black 
unions and labour organisation.
t0
At the same time the perceived shifts are real enough to have alienated a 
majority of whites in Namibia - especially ranchers and small businessmen hit 
by economic and weather hard times and/or war risks and damages. They see a 
sell out of their interests to protect those of RSA and of major enterprises 
as only too likely and oppose the whole exercise of regroupment.
On the other nand the major enterprises increasingly see independence as 
inevitable, suppression of genuine labour organisation as counterproductive, 
the 1935 attempt to reintroduce one channel state control over African
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employment as interference with basic aspects of their right to manage, the 
administration as incompetent, expensive and often corrupt. They therefore 
are sitting on their hands so far as new investment goes.
Increased state spending and reduced investment have sustained white and black 
’elite' consumption - as they did in Rhodesia after 1974 - but are
unsustainable at current production levels - as was true of the Muzorewa 
period black elite buying exercise of 1979 in Rhodesia. Further, because the 
internal contradictions of regrouping and the uncertainties raised by the 
liberation struggle have choked off new directly productive investment, the 
production base (especially in mining where only Cranjemund and Rossing of the 
large units have reasonable life expectancies) is being eroded and the ravages 
of drought are most unlikely to be reconstructed (e.g. by rebuilding cattle 
and karakul herds). Remittance not reinvestment, let alone borrowing to 
expand, is the overall hallmark of the private sector.
70The SWA-Namibia Information Service in Counter-Insurgency - A Way of Life 
may argue that "war is a costly process... A soldier fighting at the border, 
threatened by insurgents, provides a safe climate for internal economic 
growth" but the sacrifices of money, of time, potentially of life are bitterly 
resented by increasing proportions of the white and black elite populations 
(and viewed as a waste of time and money by many large enterprises). As a 
result, the "climate" is not perceived as "safe" for investment and economic 
growth is not happening, nor as far as the private sector as a whole is 
concerned - even being attempted.
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THE COST OF HOLDING NAMIBIA: WHAT BILL FOR RSA?71
In 1984 P. W. Botha restated South Africa’s old refrain that it subsidises 
Namibia but this time with three new aspects: a warning to "SWA-Namibia"
’leaders’ that South Africa first had to look out for its own people and in 
times of recession and resource scarcity those - including Namibians - who 
were not South Africans could not expect much help and needed to seek to stand 
on their own feet; a plea to the outside world - especially the Contact Group? 
- nominally to take over financing the Namibian deficit from South Africa and 
really, probably, to cause them to hesitate to take on the costs of a 
successful Namibian transition to independence and economic rehabilitation; 
third a more complete set of cost figures than presented before.
The Botha asserted 1984-35 RSA cost of holding up (in any sense one interprets 
it!) Namibia was R 1,143 million - Defence R 663 million; Customs and Excise 
transfer R 250 million; Budgetary Grants R 318 million, South African 
Transport Services deficit R 95 million. Some of these items are hardly what 
they purport to be, e.g. Customs and Excise represent a purchase of 
preferential market access and may well be below what Namibia’could get on an 
independent customs/excise system while the SATS figure appears to conflate 
capital and recurrent costs (but per contra to exclude Walvis Bay).
A more complex matrix of costs would be:
a-. ’defence’ expenditure in and on Namibia and Angola - 33% of total RSA
military, police, security spending - R 1,500 million;
b. budget grants plus external borrowing guaranteed by the RSA Treasury
and most unlikely to be accepted as valid by an independent Namibia R
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c. SATS net cash flow loss (assuming capital inclusion and Walvis 3ay
72exclusion cross cancel) - R 90 million.
That total of R 2,100 million is about 9% of the RSA government budget for 
1984/85 or about R 500 per white South African. Even more striking it is only 
slightly smaller than the likely 1984 GDP of Namibia - R 2,250 million when 
adjusted upward from official data to include Walvis Bay and subsistence.
Admittedly R 2,100 million is not a net figure. Profit and wage remittances 
plus capital flight to RSA (offsetting in part loans in the other direction) 
may come to R 300 - 400 million reducing the net cost to R 1 ,700 - 1 , 800
i
million. Admittedly too South Africa still probably has a slim external 
balance gain from Namibia - albeit if the direct and indirect import content 
(equipment, spares, technology, raw materials, fuel) of military spending is 
of the order of 303», as it may well be, even that surplus is now negligible.
What is clear is that Namibia from a South African economic perspective no 
longer pays. Recession, drought, military spending and1 the costs of 
regrouping to create a broader base for the total strategy have achieved that 
turn around. The continued strength of the Liberation Movement - implying 
rising military costs - and the failure to consolidate a viable socio 
political (or political economic) base for the "total strategy” - implying no 
recovery of enterprise and household investment or output - guarantee the 
continued desertification of the colonial ecoonomy.
There is only one remotely plausible contingency which could alter this 
picture - the proving of a substantial (say 5 million tonne a year average
500 million;
-45-
over 1 5 to 20 years) oil field. RSA wants a safe oil supply to augment its 
use of coal, its conversion of coal to oil and its 18-24 month reserve stock. 
While South Africa probably is no longer paying substantially above spot 
prices (barring totally incompetent business tactics), this was not true when 
there was a seller's market. Furthermore, coal to oil capacity is very 
capital, foreign exchange and operating cost intensive. After pro-rated 
capital cost repayment and interest a 5 million tonne a year oil field should 
yield $350 - 600 million (R 80Ó -1350 million at recent exchange rates) annual 
cash flow and foreign exchange saving. That would restore Namibia to the 
economic asset column from a South African state perspective.
The question is whether a 5 million tonne oil field scenario is realistic.^ 
While a current Johannesburg stock broker's study (apparently based on a Mobil 
reevaluation relating to one of two Soeker "wet gas" strikes offshore Luderitz 
and Oranjemund) takes a very positive view, Soekor is notably more cautious. 
No oil was in fact struck in the well, extensive drilling would be needed to 
prove a field. If Soeker's reticence is anything to go by (it could be 
disinformation in which case a burst of not very easily concealed offshore 
drilling will follow) the chances are less than. 1 in 10. Previous 'oil booms' 
have turned out to be false. Some offshore formations as well as a series in 
the Etosha Basin are potentially oil bearing and - under normal circumstances 
would deserve further exploration at seismic and probably test drilling 
levels. But as the investment in time and money could easily run to a decade 
and $500 million (and as the Etosha field if it exists would lie in a war 
zone) even South Africa and Soeker (let alone a major oil company) are none 
too likely to be willing to take the risk.
Natural gas prospects are somewhat better identified. 1’ 4 While one well cannot
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prove a field, the Kudu (Orange River delta) offshore field probably is large 
and exploitable. Soekor - after a long period of inactivity - apparently
tends too drill further wells to prove and quantify the field. Three to five
would normally be needed for this purpose and 1 2 to 1 8 months including data
analysis.
Were a field proven it would have plausible uses:
a. to provide feedstock for an ammonia/urea plant; or
b. a methanol plant;
c. to produce electricity;
d. to provide feedstock for a SASOL type gasoline production plant.
The second and third options would make little economic sense given South
Africa's coal reserves, unless and until technology to use methanol as a 
direct internal combustion engine fuel is developed. There seems little 
reason for SA to build a large, vulnerable ammonia-urea plant using Kudu as 
opposed to Mossel Bay gas.
The last option may be attractive to South Africa. In its most plausible form 
it would involve piping the gas ashore at Alexander's 3ay (in South Africa), 
converting it into ammonia and running the ammonia through the second half of 
a SASOL type plant to produce light petroleum products. Even after Namibian 
independence South Africa could hope to keep this operation - the field and 
pipeline would be offshore, the land installations in SA and Orangjemund’s 
diamond field a hostage against interference.
The problems are ones of time and cost. Assuming prompt proving of the field,
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design of pipelines and plant, raising of finance and construction fuel, 
production could begin in 1992. Assuming a plant able to meet one third of 
present oil imports (say 3 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 tonnes a year) the cost would be about 
$5,000-7,500 million (field development and pipeline to Alexander's Bay 
$200-300 million; ammonia plants $400-600 million, SAS0L ammonia conversion 
plants $4,000-6,000, pipeline to Cape or Vaal $500-750 million). Even for 
South Africa these are dauntingly high figures especially with both political 
and economic prudence leading external financial institutions to limit or seek 
to cut back on their lending to South Africa's public - and in some cases 
private -sector institutions.
SOUTH AFRICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ECONOMIC DESTABLISATION
South Africa has - whether as a strategic pre-independence design or as a 
result of the tactics of regrouping - created the infrastructure for 
intensive, systematic, rapid economic and broader destabilisation of Namibia. 
To ignore it or assume it will not be used would, given South Africa's 
regional strategy of domination and history of practicing destabilisation, be
75exceedingly unwise. At least seven elements can be identified.
First, South Africa has created an 'external debt’ which by the end of 1983 
was of the order of R 500 million with interest and debt service of the order 
of R 100 - 120 million a year and a rate of increase of perhaps R 250 - 300 
million a year. By the end of 1 9 85 it may well be approaching R 1000 million 
principal (100% of export earnings) and R 200 - 250 million annual overall 
debt service (20 - 2 5% ) To accept that debt would cripple the Namibian
economy, to repudiate it - despite the 1971 International Court of Justice
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opinion which clearly renders it legally void - could damage Namibia's 
external financial standing and access to credit.
Second, it has created a budgetary shambles both in terms of actual revenue
and expenditure and - even more - in the appearance of total, permanent
insolvency. The attempt to make Namibia appear to be a fiscal "basket case"
not worth assisting is quite clear in some of ?. W. 3otha’s statements on the
cost of the territory to South Africa, as is the warning that instant cut offs
of South African funding before a new tax and expenditure system was in place
77could cause a breakdown of governmental ability to act.
Third, in the multiple tier, racial administrative arrangements South Africa 
has created a bureaucratic monstrosity. It is not merely politically 
unacceptable as an entrenchment of racism; it is corrupt, wasteful and unable 
to operate competently for any purpose. While these functional weaknesses are 
a drawback to RSA in occupation, at independence they will threaten the 
independent state with paralysis; a paralysis South Africa can hope to enhance 
by sudden withdrawal of key technical, professional and administrative staff.
Fourth, the 'buy a bantustan' policy, and the flirtation of large companies 
with stable, skilled labour force creation and a less illiberal, less racist 
capitalism, has in the 3 0 , 0 0 0 to 50,000 household black proto wage elite/petty 
bourgeois ("middle class") created a time bomb. The professional and 
skilled/semi-skilled worker cadres are not politically loyal to South Africa. 
However, their pay scales of R 5,000 - 12,500 a year pose serious problems. 
It is economically impossible to generalise these income levels to all 
workers. Even if it were, the effect on rural-urban income inequality and on 
siphoning off resources otherwise available for rural development would be
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politieally dangerous in the extreme. To limit these scales to certain posts 
would both entrench massive intra-African income inequality and make expansion 
of basic public services fiscally impossible. To sustain them for present 
African job holders only, with new entrants on lower scales, would create 
great bitterness among returning liberation war veterans. To cut them - by 
direct scale changes or even by a freeze during an inflationary period - would 
at best lead to loss of morale and resentment that gains "won" from the South 
African occupiers were promptly eroded at independence. The bantustan 
politician, clerk, home guard components of this "middle class" pose a 
different set of problems. Their ’services' - unlike those of the 
professional and skilled personnel - are not needed. But if they are fired 
they will provide a custom built core for a political fifth column which could 
if the economy goes badly and recreating an effective state service 
apparatus is halting - provide a wider and deeper focus for discontent than - 
say - the MNR has ever had.
Fifth, by reinforcing its physical position at Walvis Bay and making plain its 
intention to remain in illegal occupation of that portion of Namibia after 
independence, South Africa has ensured that it will have a choke point to 
'regulate' Námibian policy if it allows Namibian use of the port or to 
destabilise either partially or a 1 'outrance by partial or full denial of 
access. Until Namibia creates (e.g. by reactivating Swakopmund) or gains 
access to (via Angola or Zambia) alternative ports, South Africa at Walvis Bay 
controls its basic access to the outside world and can prevent diversification 
of trade and transport away from South Africa and the uneconomic rail link to 
de Aar the Cape and the Vaal.^.
Sixth, similar considerations apply to road and rail transport. Rolling stock
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is highly mobile and - like many of the lorry fleets - is formally RSA owned. 
Major repair facilities are in Upington or Walvis Bay not Windhoek. Roads and 
rail lines without lorries and bogies and vehicle/rolling 3tock fleets without 
maintenance and repair capacity do not constitute a transport system.
Seventh, the sea bastion of South Africa’s Orange River line at Alexander's 
Bay is within mortar or launch range of Namibia's premier economic asset - the 
Oranjemund diamond complex. So too is the Swakop estuary 'boundary' of the 
Walvis Bay ’enclave' of the alternative port - Swaxopmund. The implications 
are only too clear.
DESTABILISATION LIMITATION; POTENTIAL AND LIMITS
The analysis of the infrastructure for destabilisation reveals two things: it 
is alarmingly strong and multifaceted but several, perhaps all, of its 
elements could be rendered less effective by priority attention to their
dismantling or neutralisation.
First, in fact very little of the ’external debt’ - despite RSA claims - seems 
to be held other than by South African financial institutions and all is fully 
guaranteed by RSA. An early repudiation backed by a brief based on the ICJ 
opinion and the precedents for ex-colonial debts plus a firm commitment to
honour any debt Namibia incurred would seem likely to defuse the threat either 
of bankruptcy or of lack of access to normal credit, especially as the 1 983 
Vienna Convention on Succession of State in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debt would - even were the SA administration lawful - ban
imposition of colonial debt on Namibia without the independent government’s
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consent.
Second and third, financial and administrative reform plus training/upgrading 
Namibians and securing replacement expatriates are priorities for independent 
Namibia in any event. To some extent they can be pre-planned and programmed 
before independence in the knowlege that an orderly, leisurely transition of 
the type which characterised most 3ritish colonies at independence is a luxury 
Namibia is unlikely to enjoy. Similarly some professionals will stay if 
assured as to terms and conditions of service (and indeed have had initial 
discussions with SWAPO on such issues).
Fourth, an incomes policy and an approach to mobilising professional and 
skilled Namibians, at the least, not to expect white salaries can be begun 
even before independence. Frank dialogue on constraints and problems is not 
hopeless in respect to the middle class fractions with real skills. The 
bantustan lumpen petty bourgeois elements are not really an economic, but a 
conversion or security, problem - buying them off would be an economically as 
well as politically bankrupting approach.
Fifth, interim port facilities can be created - probably by reactivating 
Swakopmund via dredging, artificial breakwaters (from laid up ships sunk in 
ballast), lighters, etc - in months and by road links to Angola and Zambia 
created over the same period of time if the priority is accepted and planning 
begun before independence. The diversion of resources would remain a severe 
cost but less of a danger and constraint than seeking to operate via a South 
African held Walvis Bay. Similarly, sixth, vehicles, rolling stock and 
maintenance/repair equipment can - if needs are identified early and priority 
given to ordering - be in place in a limited period of time.
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Economic front action cannot prevent border raids - that is primarily a 
diplomatic and security issue. However, choice of partners, e.g. a continuing 
De Beers presence at Oranjemund, North European technical partnership at 
Rossing, a Dutch or Nordic interim port management at Swakopmund would raise 
the internal and external costs to South Africa of random sabotage attacks.
The implications would appear to be: first, that South Africa has a
potentially paralysing economic destabilisation apparatus in place now; 
second, that to ignore it or hope it will never be used would be dangerous 
wishful thinking; but, third, that a number of steps could substantially 
reduce its potential to do harm.
SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC 1 BOTTOM LINES' IN NAMIBIA: SOME SPECULATIONS
Attempting to work out South Africa's basic economic goals in respect to 
independent Namibia - and in particular those in support of which it would 
utilise severe destabilisation cannot be a very precise or definitive 
exercise:
a. from a narrowly economic perspective, RSA would gain by evacuating 
Namibia now; but
b. will clearly not make its decision on when and how to leave on purely 
Namibian (as opposed to Namibian - Angolan and regional) considerations 
much less purely on narrowly economic ones;
c. Pretoria watching is no more an exact science than White Houseology or 
Kremlinology;
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d. especially as it is doubtful that South Africa’s decision takers have 
reached firm conclusions on what and when, much less on the details of 
how;
c. and the reasons for their uncertainties do not really turn
substantially on Namibian economic cost/benefit accounting.
In fact the basic South African bottom lines for Namibia are much more likely 
to turn on such issues as ”no foreign troops”, ”a quiet Orange River frontier” 
than on economic questions per se. South Africa clearly will wish Namibia to 
accept the AG’s 'external debt’, continue to use South African Transport 
Services, stay in the Rand Monetary Union and South African Customs Union 
Arrangements, source most imports from South Africa, go slow on cooperating 
with Botswana on building the Transkaiahari (a major blow to South African 
transport leverage over Botswana, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Zambia). It 
will be strongly averse to general confiscation of enterprise and settler 
assets (the latter as much for domestic political as for economic reasons) and 
to Namibia becoming prosperous on its own and increasing the room for economic 
manoeuvre of the SADCC region.
However, none of these - not even the ’debt* - would appear certain to be an 
economic casus belli. The wholesale early confiscation might be because it 
would reduce external support for Namibia and - given personnel, institutional 
and financial constraints - might leave the economy and the state apparatus 
very much weakened. South Africa will certainly try sticks (e.g. blocking 
access for Namibian beef, recall of key personnel) and carrots (more generous 
SACUA formulae, technical assistance) to achieve the economic objectives noted 
as part or a continued strategy to maintain/achieve the economic side of the 
Constellation of dependent economies circling around and exploited by South
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Africa. But to assume it would use (as opposed to threatening) massive 
destabilisation as a routine instrument may be unnecessarily pessimistic.
WHAT OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE?
What is clear from the earlier discussion is that Res. 435 is not a perfect 
solution to the problem of SA's illigal occupation of Namibia. From the
outset SWAPO took the view that, should the proposals being put to it offer
the opportunity for a settlement which would broadly reflect what the vast
majority of Namibians want, SWAPO would cooperate in this, even though the
7Qproposals make quite considerable concessions to Pretoria. SWAPO has been 
only too aware of the numerous political risks resulting from all the 
concessions it has had to make in Pretoria's favour. But SWAPO has
consistently urged early implementation because it knows what immense support 
it has throughout Namibia and believes that in spite of the concesions to 
Pretoria in Res. 435, SWAPO would still win by a large majority. SWAPO’s
flexibility and readiness to proceed with Res. 435 arises from a position of
strength reflected in its very evident support among Namibians,
However, it is instructive to take a closer look at Res. 435, the
possibilities open to Pretoria for manipulation, disruption or total sabotage, 
and the resultant need to be acutely aware of the immense ramifications this 
could have in making a newly independent Namibia virtually ungovernable if the 
process is not sabotaged before completion. Conversely, it is imperative to 
examine the resolution critically so as to make provision for an adequately 
"free and fair" election and to project the need for insisting on the 
implementation of Res. 435 in a way which would reflect the established UN
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position on Namibia. It is clear from a close examination that much would 
depend on the UN officials acting responsibly and in accordance with the UN 
position incorporated in numerous UN resolutions on Namibia.
Namibia is not approaching independence in a vacuum. The difference between 
implementing Res. 435 in 1978 and at some future date is not simply a matter 
of a difference in time. Pretoria seeks to make nonsense of Res. 435 by 
changing the structures within the country and by setting impossible 
parameters for the implementation of the Resolution. Without great vigilance 
on the part of SWAPO and the UN, whose responsibility it would be to ensure
that Res. 435 is implemented fairly, Pretoria may attempt to create a
situation where the process of implementation could be sabotaged, destroying
the possibility of future implementation. They could attempt to wipe out the
SWAPO leadership, or create a situation where the government emerging would 
find it effectively impossible to govern the country. Basically Pretoria is 
busy laying the groundwork for a massive destabilisation of Namibia if, at 
some point, it is forced to bow to the pressure to implement Res. 435. The 
only circumstances under which Pretoria will willingly agree to implement Res. 
435 would be those in which it perceives the opportunity of making gains for 
itself; by using the process to set up a puppet government; by destroying 
SWAPO; by so destabilising Namibia that the government of the newly 
independent country would be forced to capitulate to Pretoria's demands. 
Measures can and must be taken to ensure that Res. 435 is implemented fairly 
and so achieve the goal of genuine independence for Namibia.
8o
Res. 435 adopted by the Security Council on the 30 September 1978, consists 
of a plan for the election in Namibia of a constituent assembly and for 
eventual independence. The Resolution adopts the report of the UN Secretary
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General which was drawn up following his Special Representative's survey
mission to Namibia during August 1978 and a further explanatory statement of 
82that report . The report is specifically based on the "Western proposals"
for a Namibian settlement. ^  Basically it sets out a specific seven month
programme leading to the election of a constituent assembly. The seven month
period is divided into a four month period beginning with a ceasefire between
84SWAPO and SA during which the withdrawal of SA forces and emplacement of 
UNTAG must take place, all those in exile allowed to return to Namibia, all 
political prisoners released, and all discriminatory or restrictive 
legislation repealed. The last three months consist of the official election 
campaign culminating in the election of a constituent assembly. It is 
anticipated in the "Western proposals" (but not discussed in any detail) that 
the constituent assembly will sit for about five months before agreeing on a 
constitution and Namibia becoming independent.
SA PLANS FOR EXPLOITING THE VAGARIES OF RESOLUTION 435
85The UN plan makes provision for the SA administration to organise and run
86the election with the UN taking on a role of "supervision and control"' of 
the electoral process.
Originally, no specific provision was made in Res. 435 for the nature of the 
electoral process and it was therefore possible for Pretoria to decide the 
electoral system and to make it known at only a time of its choice even after 
the beginning of the implementation of Res. 435. However, this has now been 
superceded by Res. 539 (1983) which requires that Pretoria communicate its 
choice of an electoral system "prior to the adoption by the Security Council
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of an enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations
o*7
Plan”. While this at least offers some sort of check on Pretoria
introducing a convoluted electoral system designed to enable its greater 
manipulation by the regime, the electoral system could still be open to 
considerable abuse.
The registration process could be rushed and could take place at a time when
the majority of the considerable number of exiled SWAPO personnel are still
out of the country. Pretoria would aim at restricting as far as possible the
number of SWAPO voters while maximising the registration of voters supporting
its puppet parties (including registration of many not qualified to vote such
as South Africans or Angolans). By hurrying the process at the beginning of
the seven month period, Pretoria would aim at being well organised itself,
while hoping to prevent SWAPO from establising the organisational network it
would need to ensure the registration of SWAPO voters. This could already
produce a distortion in the results. If Pretoria has decided on a single
member constituency system for the whole or part of the electoral process, it
should be expected that it would then proceed to delimit constituencies in
accordance with the type of provisions contained in the existing electoral 
38legislation . This provision would allow for a ’loading” or ’unloading” of 
constituencies by 15% above or below the average number of voters per 
constituency; there could be as much as a 3 0? difference between the largest 
and smallest constituencies. This could then be abused to allow for a 
relatively small number of voters in constituencies Pretoria hopes its puppets 
would win, and a relatively large number of voters in constituencies which 
Pretoria expects SWAPO to win. Already before a vote is cast, Pretoria could 
have seriously prejudiced the outcome of the election.
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Each stage of the electoral process must be completed "to the satisfaction of
the Special Representative", and the official election campaign will only
commence "after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied
himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures"^.
However, there will be enormous pressures on the Secretary General’s Special
Representative (SR) to declare himself "satisfied"; Pretoria could threaten to
abandon the whole operation if it did not have its way, and the governments of
the Contact Group countries, all of whom plan to have substantial delegations
in Windhoek supposedly to monitor the process, would be likely to lean on the
SR, counselling him not to insist on what he seeks for fair implementation, as
it could mean the complete breakdown of the whole process. They may also
90argue that if the system SA is using is similar to their own it cannot be 
dismissed as unfair. The ultimate "success" of the implementation of Res. 435 
could be important to the career of the SR, and if insisting on fairness on 
the part of Pretoria is likely to result in the irretrievable breakdown of the 
electoral process, he may be persuaded to turn a blind eye instead of opposing 
what SA is attempting to do. In these circumstances he may rely on the status 
of the Contact Group and his own reputation to repudiate any accusation of 
unfairness.
Pretoria may also decide to go for a system that is constituency based but 
which also makes adjustments to accommodate a degree of proportional 
representation. It may introduce such a provision in order to insist on a 
representation of political groups who may otherwise have no seats 
by establishing the requirement that a party which obtains 0.5? or 1? of the 
total vote would be entitled to a seat. With the number of "parties" Pretoria 
claims exist in Namibia, this could be made to produce a significant number of 
seats for puppet parties.
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There are numerous ways in which the SA administration in Namibia may rig the
election itself, and make campaigning considerably more difficult for SWAPO.
It could, for example, produce misleading information in selectd areas,
disqualify candidates, intimidate the population to the extent that it felt it
could get away with it, stuff ballot boxes prior to the beginning of the
election, or insist that illiterate voters are "assisted” by its own
officials. It will almost certainly create bureaucratic difficulties for
SWAPO in importing the vehicles it has in neighbouring states which are
q 1essential for campaigning in Namibia7 . Likewise it will prevent or greatly 
delay campaign materials or paper supplies coming in from abroad. That after 
all happended to ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe without there being any effective 
redress and the election was declared "free and fair".
It would thus be possible, though not by any means inevitable, that Pretoria 
could gain a blocking one third of the seats in the constituent assembly. It 
is very difficult to estimate votes for pro-SA parties at over 15—20% of an 
unrigged total. In such a context rigging the total recorded to 33% would be 
difficult - though not impossible - to achieve without a self evidently 
fraudulent and unsaleable pattern of actions. In the unlikely event of 
Pretoria achieving this objective, it would seek the constitution it wants, 
refusing to agree on a constitution unless SWAPO capitulates to all its
demands. This could create an inherently unstable and lengthy delay in 
agreeing a constitution, or, more likely, a complete deadlock in the process. 
In such circumstances Pretoria could be expected to seek to send in its troops 
again to "restore law and order" the breakdown of which it had generated. In 
this way it could cause an irreversible breakdown in Res. 435 so as to achieve
what it wants, the complete re-negotiation of a settlement proposal and the
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ditching of Res. 435. This admittedly would pose problems if the SR and UNTAG 
enunciated a credible intent to resist the SA reinvasion by force if 
necessary. Previous action by UN military units faced with the threat of 
force has perhaps convinced SA no such resistance would be likely. Even then 
the international cost (as well as the resumed war) would presumably be such 
as to make SA more willing to threaten such action than to employ it.
Assuming SWAPO wins two thirds or more of the seats in the constituent
assembly, Pretoria may still seek to impose procedures in the constituent
assembly making progress difficult. It may for instance require that the two
thirds majority be of all members of the assembly and not simply of those
present and voting. A few arrests on trumped up charges of SWAPO members of
the assembly could take care of reducing SWAPO’ s majority to less than two
thirds of the whole assembly. It may also insist on the inclusion of its
interpretation of the "constitutional principles" drawn up by the Contact 
92Group in 19o2 under threat of not withdrawing the remainder of its troops, 
police and administration, and preventing the eventual independence of Namibia 
being proclaimed. Nothing in Res. 435 gives SA powers to take such steps and 
in the absence of any contrary provision, the Assembly would normally be 
assumed to have the power to adopt its own procedures, but SA cannot be 
assumed to be willing to accept that position.
Much would depend on the organisational readiness of SWAPO to cope with these 
eventualities, the adequate training of SWAPO cadres to provide its own 
effective monitoring of the election, the integrity and independence of the SR 
and UNTAG and on the proper functioning of the UN Security Council in 
providing a checking process during the course of implementation. The 
enabling Security Council resolution required to begin implementation of Res.
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435 should provide for reports to be made to the Security Council on the 
implementation of Res. 435, for example at the end of the first twelve weeks 
and again shortly before the election date, and should require that the 
procedure be temporarily suspended pending the acceptance by the Security 
Council that each stage has been satisfactorily implemented. This would 
provide some balancing pressure on the SR to ensure that all aspects of the 
election are implemented fairly. Failure to do so could attract a veto of the 
Security Council's decision to proceed to the next stage.
CONCLUSION
This chapter comes in the form of a warning, an attempt to explain and expose 
the intentions of the Pretoria regime over Namibia. It is important to expose 
the South African regime's probable intentions for Namibia's future, the
possible manoeuvres they might attempt to secure their objectives and the 
loopholes existing in present arrangements. It is, however, our firm belief 
that Pretoria will not succeed in reaching its objectives. The fundamental 
characater of the political and economic crisis in both South Africa and
Namibia lead to the conclusion that the regime will never be able to pull off 
the neo-colonial solution it is currently hoping to achieve and that its 
destabilisation infrastructure's impact can be reduced and contained even 
though not wholly eliminated.
The most critical factor is the continuing mass resistance of the Namibian
people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Namibian people's struggle for
independence constitutes a dynamic in itself and is part of a greater African 
and Southern African dynamic. It is the Namibian people who, through their
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vigilance and resistance prevent the racist South African regime from imposing 
a client regime on Namibia. It is the armed struggle and political 
mobilisation within Namibia supported by the international campaigning abroad 
to isolate Pretoria and to force it to relinquish control of Namibia which 
will determine the extent to which Pretoria is able to attain its objectives. 
Today there are few, even in conservative, anti-SWAPO circles internationally, 
who would deny the mass support that SWAPO enjoys in Namibia. Certainly South 
Africa believes SWAPO does have mass support - otherwise it would have held 
less implausible internal or agreed to internationally monitored elections 
long ago. SWAPO has also amassed unparalleled support within the OAU, the 
Non-Aligned Movement and within the UN itself. The capacity lies with SWAPO 
successfully to resist the attempts constantly being made to force on it 
something less than an adequate solution. In the greater context of the 
struggle for the liberation of the whole of Southern Africa, the Pretoria 
government faces major problems on virtually every front.
The mass resistance so evident within South Africa itself also serves to 
weaken the capacity of the regime to retain its illegal occupation of Namibia. 
The regime is being forced to commit mere and more of its troops and police
within South Africa and its violence and brutality are becoming more evident
to the international community as the regime tries to quell that resistance.
As a result South Africa is steadily gaining a reputation among western
business investors as being an area of too great a risk for their investment 
and also as one investments in which have too great a 'hassle factor' in terms 
of negative image domestically to be worthwhile if they are secondary from an 
overall business point of view. Coupled with an economy in a state of deep 
structural crisis, South Africa is not able to attract the external financing 
it needs.
*» «
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For SA, as already outlined, Namibia is a fiscal and military personnel drag. 
If the war in Namibia escalates at the same time as tensions and 
pre-revolutionary violence rise in SA it could easily become a "black hole" in 
the astronomical sense sucking in South Africa's finance, armaments and 
personnel at an ever increasing rate until not simply South African rule in 
Namibia but the regime's ability to suppress, buy off and manage threats to 
its survival at home was destroyed.
The gross cost of holding down Namibia, already is one tenth of South Africa's 
state budget, about half its annual external borrowing and over R500 per white 
South African. That is a heavy cost now. Since the South African economy is 
in a prolonged slump, many financial institutions outside SA view it as 
prudent (for whatever reason) to reduce - not expand - exposure in SA and as 
the net flow of equity capital is out - not in - this cost is likely to become 
harder, not easier, to bear in the next few years. Further, any serious 
attempt to surmount the 1985 pre-revolutionary violence will be expensive in 
terms of military and police expenditure to suppress violence and of spending 
on bantustans and townships to try to lessen discontent and buy a black 
clientele.
Related to this is the narrowly military set of issues. South Africa has over 
half of its front line infantry tied down in Namibia. Both logistical and 
military considerations make their speedy redeployment to meet threats to the 
regime at home virtually impossible. From a military security point of view a 
much smaller force on the more easily defensible Orange River Line and a 
substantial home based tactical force available to meet domestic threats would 
clearly make more sense even now and increasingly so if 1985 is not followed
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by a period of much lower physical challenge to the regime (as Sharpeville and 
Soweto were).
Pretoria’s attempt to present a Namibian facade to its military presence in 
Namibia through the establishment of SWATF has, since its establishment, run 
into considerable difficulties. The regime's objective is to establish an 
army in Namibia which it can claim to be ’Namibian' capable of replacing the 
official South African forces in Namibia. To attain this the force would have 
to be largely black, would need to be fairly well trained in order to handle 
the technical sophistication of SA military equipment and would need to 
produce a reasonable level of morale. On all three fronts Pretoria has 
problems.
Although Pretoria predicted quite a rapid transfer of its military occupation 
from the SADF/SAP to SWATF/SWAP in 1979, it has still not reached that 
objective six years later. It first attempted to raise a "volunteer” force. 
Those it attracted tended to be largely from a criminal element with 
"recruits” often being offered the option of a "job” in the regime’s forces as 
an alternative to serving a prison term. They also attracted a number of 
young Namibians who saw starvation as the alternative to serving with the 
occupation forces and whose political awareness was not sufficiently developed 
for them to see the folly of such a move. Some of them have since deserted 
and joined PLAN. In Namibia today, with the recent drought and a high rate of 
unemployment, young men would find the relatively lucrative employment with 
Pretoria's forces quite attractive. A difficulty the regime has faced with 
these recruits is a lack of motivation really to fight SWAPO. Their prime 
motivation for joining is financial, in contrast to SWAPO’s forces in PLAN who 
tend to be highly motivated politically, which is critical to maintaining a
« •
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high level of morale.
The declared intention of the Pretoria regime is to conscript all Namibian 
males betwen the ages of 16 and 65. The firsts attempts, which avoided 
conscription of those in the northern regions of Namibia, judged by Pretoria 
to be more committed to SWAPO, brought strong opposition from Namibians in the 
central and southern regions to being drafted into a military force illegally 
in occupation of Namibia and set against fellow Namibians. Many potential
conscripts chose rather to leave Namibia and join PLAN. The more recent
attempt to conscript Namibians began with a sudden order that all males in the 
Sector 10 area (Tsumeb, Otavi, Grootfontein) would have to register within two 
weeks. In spite of assistance offered by the companies who forced reluctant
workers to register, Pretoria seems again not to have followed through with
the process as it had said it intended to do. The underlying problem for 
Pretoria in conscripting Namibians is the overwhelming support they know SWAPO 
has throughout the country. They realise consequently, that conscription of 
the indigenous population in Namibia holds grave risks for the regime of 
having its forces thoroughly infiltrated by SWAPO sympathisers. Minutes of a 
SA military intelligence conference held in May 1984 and released to the press 
in 3ritain by SWAPO, recognised that "SWAPO internally is organised on a wide 
terrain on different levels and possesses the infrastructure to collect 
information over a wide spectrum...""^. They fear that valuable information 
could be leaked to PLAN or that trained military personnel might desert in 
order to join PLAN.
They also realise that morale may ultimately prove to be decisive in the war 
but that they are unable to maintain the necessary level of motivation and 
morale among their forces to sustain their military efforts. They realise
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that morale will be that much greater a problem in an army pitched against the 
very people it is drawn from and which is patently being used by the regime to 
maintain its illegal presence in Nambia. The above mentioned military 
intelligene conference also recognised the problem: ’What is really disturbing 
is the damaging of military equipment by military personnel which could 
indicate sabotage, particularly if the negative attitude of certain conscripts 
is taken into consideration”. Here, "political convictions do play a role”"'*. 
The near paranoia evident in these minutes indicate that the SA military 
bosses are not at all confident about motivation and the morale of ’their’ 
forces. Even among white conscripts motivated by a racist hate and a belief 
that they are heroically confronting a very vicious and all consuming monster 
called communism, Pretoria has had to deal with a serious morale problem.
In an attempt in part to counter this problem it can be expected that SWATF 
will retain a very large South African and mercenary component. This can 
already be illustrated by the extensive use of a SA/mercenary officer corps 
for forces which are otherwise largely indigneous. The process will also 
continue as illustrated in the recent transfer of Xoevcet from the SAP to the 
SWAP, where South African members of Koevoet were "tranferred or seconded" to 
these supposedly Namibian forces .
The South African regime's presenting a Namibian face to its military 
occupation is not going to reduce costs to the South African treasury unless, 
of course, they choose to reduce the size of their military machine, an option 
which would seriously weaken their current tenuous hold on Namibia. The 
alternative of retaining the current real levels of military expenditure in a 
very severe economic climate will become increasingly difficult unless the 
decline or ohe South Airican economy can be reversed.
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Scuth Africa's closest allies are finding it harder and harder to defend the 
regime aboard. This has become particularly apparent in the case of the 
United States. In spite of the vigorous support for Pretoria by the Reagan 
administration, the latter is now coming under unprecedented domestic pressure 
to apply sanctions. The British government while not under the same degree of 
domestic pressure, is isolated within the Commonwealth in its refusal to apply 
sanctions against South Africa, and cannot ignore the very strong opinions in 
favour of sanctions being expressed by the Non-Alligned Movement and the 
Organisation of African Unity.
But the SA regime faces its greatest problems in constructing a political 
front to its occupation of Namibia. The first attempt failed in early 1933 
when Pretoria decided to revert to the one person administration of its 
colonial governor, the Administrator General. Almost immediately work began 
on seeking an alternative puppet government which culminated more than two 
years later with the setting of the MFC's "Transitional Government of National 
Unity" on 17 June, 1985, a regime which had demonstrably less claim to 
represent any significant number of black Namibians than its predecessor.
Not unexpectedly this puppet government immediately began demonstrating
disunity, power ambitions and individualism. It appears that its common
purpose is confined to maximising financial inducements to its members and
96their closest cronies . An almost comical row over who should be "chairman"
on the cabinet (and paraded as a type of Prime Minister) errupted on 16 June,
1985, the evening before this puppet government was inaugurated. Apparently
Kozonguizi objected to the proposal that Katjiuongua be the first chairman of 
Q7„ M n p /  • Otner "cabinet ministers" also expressed their intense
« # -68-
interest in the position and the titbits that go with it. A compromise was 
eventually reached which consists of rotating the chairmanship of the cabinet 
alphabetically at three monthly intervals. Thus David Bezuidenhout became the 
first chairman of the cabinet. This example is symptomatic of the potential 
for conflict within the MPC which has been bogged down on such fundamental 
issues as to whether decisions will be made on the basis of a majority vote or 
by consensus. These disagreements will continue and ultimately contribute to 
the breakup of the MPC.
This puppet government will have neither the power nor the will fundamentally 
to move away from the gross maldistribution of habitable productive land nor 
will it fundamentally alter the present maldistribution of wealth or control 
over the natural resources of Namibia. As much as they may parade themselves 
as a "government”, they will be unable to win over the support of the 
Namibian people but will instead be seen for what they are - stooges of ;the 
Pretoria regime. They will continue the internal squabbling over status and 
privilege that has characterised the MPC from its inception until this 
"transitional government" eventually collapses.
Whatever antics Pretoria may get up to with the intention of avoiding a SWAPO 
government in Windhoek, the regime will eventually be forced to capitulate and 
that the Namibian people, under SWAPO’s leadership will achieve the liberation 
of their country and genuine national independence. It has reached a stage in 
which it is clearly on dead end roads on the economic, political and military 
fronts. How fast it can be pushed down the remaining distance - and forced to 
accept Namibian independence - depends primarily on the Namibian people and 
SWAPO but can be influenced significantly both by domestic (i.e. internal to 
South Africa) and external pressures on the Pretoria regime. Similarly how
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successful SA can be in perpetuating economic dependency relations by Namibia 
and in destabilising a genuinely independent Namibia will depend primarily on 
alertness, planned vulnerability reduction and commitment to continued 
struggle by the people of Namibia and their government, but also can be 
significantly influenced by what price South Africa has to pay in terms of 
external national, enterprise and international actions (not just statements) 
taken in response to/reaction against aggressive destabilisation.
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